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 1 Introduction
The management of common-pool resources (CPRs), such as forests, ﬁshing grounds, and groundwater
basins, is characterized by a conﬂict between individual and social interests. While the collective interest of
the group is to limit harvesting to a sustainable level, the combined actions of individual harvesters pursuing
their own interest inevitably result in a suboptimal outcome, characterized by excessive exploitation of the
resource (Dasgupta and Heal, 1979: Chapter 3). This dilemma can take the form of a game played by two
types of harvesters: namely, defectors and cooperators, adopting high and low levels of harvest, respectively
(Ostrom et al., 1994). In the ﬁnitely repeated CPRgame, unilateral defection is the unique Nash equilibrium,
while privatization of the resource is often the suggested management solution.
Privatization is, however, not always feasible in the case of common-pool resources, or it may destroy
the culturally evolved social norms. Moreover, while economic theory predicts defection, case studies
and laboratory experiments have provided evidence that, in real life, cooperation can be sustained among
harvesters (Ostrom, 1990; Hackett et al., 1994; Chermak and Krause, 2002). Accordingly, cooperative
outcomes can be reached as long as norms or rules, such as trust, reward or punishment, prevail in the
group. The imposition of sanctions on harvesters that adopt excessive exploitation levels has proved to
be particularly effective in sustaining cooperation, even in the case of non-repeated interactions among
unrelated individuals or in very large groups. Evidence from the ﬁeld suggests that some agents voluntarily
engage in ‘altruistic punishment’, that is, penalizing free-riders, even if this implies an individual cost.
Often, a small proportion of these altruistic punishers is sufﬁcient to enforce cooperation in the group (Fehr
and G¨ achter, 2002).
A rare theoretical analysis of the role of altruistic punishers or ‘enforcers’ in solving CPR dilemmas
is presented in Sethi and Somanathan (1996). They consider an evolutionary CPR game played by a ﬁxed
population of players with three strategies: defection, cooperation, and enforcement. Payoffs of defectors
are lowered by a sanction that depends on the number of enforcers in the population, while enforcers bear
a cost that depends upon the total number of defectors. Players experience social learning and imitate the
strategy that yields the highest payoffs. The evolution of strategies is captured by a replicator dynamics
equation, according to which the share of the best-performing strategy in the population increases due to
agents imitating it. Sethi and Somanathan combine replicator and resource dynamics to show how changes
in the resource stock affect harvesting behavior, and vice versa. They identify two equilibria in the system:
2namely, a ﬁnal population composed of only defectors, and a cooperative equilibrium with only cooperators
and enforcers.
The model considered in this paper adds a major innovation to Sethi and Somanathan’s work, namely
spatial interactions between agents. While Sethi and Somanathan restrict themselves to aggregate population
dynamics, our model more realistically emphasizes the role of locality. The approach is, therefore, unlike
replicator dynamics, based on the explicit modeling of micro-interactions among individuals. This approach
results in a combination of local and global interactions. Global interactions include effects that run through
aggregate harvest and the resource stock, and feed back to proﬁts associated with harvesting strategies
employed by individual agents.
The objective of the present paper is to ﬁnd conditions for the emergence of cooperative equilibria
in the spatial evolutionary CPR game. The objective comes down to testing the robustness of Sethi and
Somanathan’s ﬁndings in an evolutionary game with spatial interactions. In particular, it will be examined
whether other types of equilibria than found by Sethi and Somathan emerge.
The present CPR game with spatial interactions has connections with two different bodies of literature.
First, it relates to studies on local interaction games within the ﬁeld of evolutionary game theory (Eshel et
al., 1998; Lindgren and Nordahl, 1994; for an overview, see Nowak and Singmund, 1999). The structure
of our game relates most closely to Nowak and May (1992). A well-known result of the literature on local
games is that the introduction of local interactions between agents enhances the survival of cooperation.
The game presented in this article differs from these approaches in that it combines both local and global
interactions.
Second, the approach presented here also relates to the wide body of experimental and theoretical work
on the evolution of social norms in CPR games (Ostrom et al., 1994). In this literature, only a very few
studies have formally analyzed an evolutionary CPR game with a variable resource stock (Akiyama and
Kaneko, 2000; Janssen, 2001; Sethi and Somanathan, 1996). Among these studies, Sethi and Somanathan’s
analysis provides an attractive benchmark because of its simplicity, which is due to a combination of only
three types of strategies and replicator dynamics. The present study adds insights to this literature as it
illustrates how results from local interaction games can be applied to the problem of overexploitation of
common-pool resources. For this purpose numerical simulation techniques are used.
The problem of local interaction in a common-pool resource game is also studied by Noailly et al.
3(2004). But its setup differs substantially from the present one, in two respects. First, it studies interaction
when agents are located on a circle, whereas here we consider interaction between agents situated on a
torus. On the one hand, the circle allows for more theoretical insights, because of the fact that the structure
is less complicated. On the other hand, the torus provides a richer and more realistic spatial structure of
interactions and learning among agents. Most real world interactions, like in agriculture or in ﬁsheries,
occur in two-dimensional space. Second, Noailly et al. (2004) employ a different learning rule. In their
settings, agents imitate the strategy yielding the highest average payoffs. For most parts of the present
paper, we assume that agents are more ‘naive’ and simply imitate their most successful neighbor. We ﬁnd
that changing the learning rule does not qualitatively affect the results found in Noailly et al. (2004). We also
ﬁnd the emergence of equilibria in which cooperators and enforcers coexist in our settings. In this sense,
our analysis can be seen as a robustness test of the analysis of Noailly et al. (2004). Yet, we ﬁnd quantitative
differences between the two models. A main new insight of the present study is that cluster equilibria of
cooperators and defectors are favored when agents are learning in a ‘naive’ way. This study presents in
addition new results regarding the role of certain parameters, like population size and the productivity of
harvesting technology.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the benchmark neoclassical CPR game and its
evolutionary spatial version. Section 3 identiﬁes the equilibria of the system with a ﬁxed resource level
and shows how these contrast with Sethi and Somanathan’s ﬁndings. In addition, we test for the effects
of changes in parameters. Section 4 discusses the impact of adding resource dynamics to the evolutionary
system. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 The CPR game
The benchmark neoclassical CPR game (Dasgupta and Heal, 1979: Chapter 3; Chichilnisky, 1994) is pre-
sented brieﬂy here. This game relies on the assumption of maximizing behavior and thus contrasts sharply
with the evolutionary version of the game that will be discussed further on.
A ﬁxed population of m (m > 1) harvesters has access to a natural resource. The individual effort level
of harvester i (i = 1;:::;m) in period t (t = 0;1;:::) is denoted by xit. Total effort of the population is





Aggregate harvest H is a strictly concave and increasing function of total effort Xt and of the total stock
of natural resources Nt. In a ﬁrst stage, we ignore resource dynamics to simplify the analysis and ﬁx the
resource stock Nt at N0. Suppressing N0, we can write the harvest rate as a function of X only and we
can ignore time subscripts for all variables. We deﬁne F as the total harvest rate, which is strictly concave
and increasing with F(0) = 0, F 0(0) > w, F 0(1) < w, where w is the constant cost per unit of effort
employed.
H(X;N0) = F(X): (2)
Each agent receives a share of total proﬁts in proportion to the amount of effort invested. Individual proﬁts




F(X)   wxi; (3)
where it is assumed that the harvested commodity is the numeraire. Individual payoffs are thus a function
of a global factor, namely aggregate harvest. The larger aggregate harvest is, that is, the more defectors are




i(xi;X) = F(X)   wX: (4)
At XP, which is the Pareto efﬁcient level of effort deﬁned by F 0(XP) = w, total proﬁts are maximized
and the resource is used efﬁciently. When access to the resource is open to everyone, entry of harvesters
continues until X0, where F(XO) = wXO, i.e., no harvester enjoys positive proﬁts. In the case of a ﬁxed
population ofagents, maximization of individual proﬁts inthe CPRgameleads toasuboptimal outcome XC.
This is the unique Nash equilibrium that is inefﬁcient (XC > XP) but yields positive rents (XC < XO).
An evolutionary version of this standard framework has been studied by Sethi and Somanathan (1996).
In an evolutionary game, harvesters are boundedly rational, which means that they do not solve any opti-
mization problem. Instead, they rely on simple forms of social learning like imitation of the best-performing
strategy. Diffusion of strategies occurs through the learning process and drives the evolution of strategies
towards an equilibrium that falls between the benchmark equilibrium aggregate harvest rates XP and XO.
5In the remainder of the paper, we base our analysis on a similar evolutionary framework but introduce spatial
interactions between the agents.
2.2 A spatial evolutionary CPR game without resource dynamics
The spatial evolutionary CPR game embodies the following four main features:
Space. A ﬁxed population of m harvesters is distributed on a two-dimensional torus. A torus is a lattice
whose corners are pasted together to ensure that all cells are connected, so that there are no edge-effects.
On a torus, all cells in the ﬁrst row (column) are connected to cells in the last row (column). For example,
the cell in the top-left corner is connected not only to its right and bottom neighbors, but also to the cells in
the bottom-left corner and top-right corners. Each single cell of the torus is occupied by one, ﬁxed player
during the game. We deﬁne the neighborhood of each player as the set of the four closest neighbors, located
North, South, East, and West of the player, as shown in Figure 1. An alternative deﬁnition of neighborhood
entails eight neighbors (adding North- and South-East and North- and South-West neighbors). We will not
go into this.
[INSERT Figure 1 about here]
Strategies. Just as in Sethi and Somanathan (1996), we consider three possible different types of strategy
for every player: defection, cooperation, and enforcement. Enforcers punish defectors. Both cooperators
and enforcers choose a low level of effort xL to avoid overexploitation of the resource, while defectors
choose a high level of effort xH, which yields higher proﬁts ceteris paribus. Individual effort levels xL and
xH are ﬁxed such that:
XP  mxL < mxH  XO; (5)
with XP and XO as deﬁned in the previous section, and mxL (mxH) the total harvest when all agents
harvest low (high).
In each round  ( = 0;1;:::) of the game, the aggregate effort X is calculated according to the
distribution of strategies in the population:
X = mD;xH + (mE; + mC;)xL; (6)
where mD;, mE; and mC; are, respectively, the number of defectors, enforcers and cooperators present
6in the system in round .
Enforcers punish all defectors located in their neighborhood. Monitoring is thus conducted locally
among close neighbors. This is a major difference with Sethi and Somanathan’s model in which sanctions
are imposed by the group of enforcers on the group of defectors at the aggregate level. Here, each enforcer
punishing a defector bears a cost 
 per defector, while each defector being punished by an enforcer pays a
sanction . The maximum sanction falling on a defector is thus 4, when he is surrounded by four enforcers.
Similarly, the maximum cost borne by an enforcer is 4
.













(F(X)   wX)   l
; (9)
Here j; denotes payoffs in round  for strategy j (j 2 fC;D;Eg), k (k 2 f0;1;2;3;4g) denotes the
number of enforcers in the neighborhood of any given defector, and l (l 2 f0;1;2;3;4g) the number of
defectors in the neighborhood of any given enforcer. We use the notations Dk to refer to a defector punished
k times and thus paying the sanction k. Similarly, El refers to an enforcer surrounded by l defectors. Thus,
e.g. D3;2 refers to the payoffs of a defector surrounded by three enforcers in round  = 2. Obviously,
Dh; > Dh+1; and Eh; > Eh+1; (h 2 f0;1;2;3g). In addition, from (5), (7), (8), and (9), we have
D0; > C; > E1; and E0; = C; for all .
We make one additional assumption regarding the level of punishment in the system, namely:
D4; < E0;; 8: (10)
This implies that a defector incurring the maximum sanction level, regardless of X, earns a lower payoff
than any enforcer who does not punish (E0). This is to ensure that enforcers can actually win over defectors.
7We further assume that H(X;N0) is a Cobb-Douglas production function:
F(X) = XN
1 
0  > 0; 0 <  < 1: (11)
As discussed in Section 2.1, we can solve F 0(XP) = w and F(XO) = wXO to ﬁnd XP and XO, respec-
tively. This gives:
XP = ( w
)
1






Learning, i.e., updating of strategies, is driven by expectations of larger proﬁts in the next period. In
each round, every player updates his current strategy by imitating the strategy that yields the highest payoffs
in his neighborhood. Similar learning rules, where agents simply pick up the strategy with the largest score,
were used by Axelrod (1984, Chapter 8) and Nowak and May (1992). Eshel et al. (1998) instead impose a
learning rule in which the on average best performing strategy in the observed neighbourhood is imitated.
This rule is examined with a spatial evolutionary analysis in another paper (Noailly et al., 2004). When the
best strategy in the neighborhood is identical to the player’s current strategy, the player sticks to his current
strategy. When multiple strategies other than the player’s current strategy yield the largest (equal) payoffs
in the neighborhood, that is, when there is a tie between two strategies, the player randomizes among these
strategies with probability p = 0:5.
Time. We assume that agents exhibit synchronous behavior. In other words, interactions and learning
occur simultaneously. Huberman and Glance (1993) have shown that asynchronous learning can lead to
different outcomes than synchronous learning. In our model, seasonal harvesting of the resource suggests
the existence of a ‘global clock’ that governs the learning process. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume
that all harvesters modify their strategy simultaneously at the beginning of each new season. A season or a
‘round’ of the game can be described by the following sequence:
(i) Aggregate effort X is computed given the number of defectors, cooperators and enforcers on the
torus.
(ii) Aggregate harvest F(X) is calculated.
(iii) Individual payoffs C, Dk and El are computed for all agents, given F(X), the strategy chosen by
8each single agent and the distribution of strategies in his neighborhood.
(iv) Agents observe the payoffs of their neighbors’ strategies and decide whether to stick to their current
strategy or to adopt the strategy of their most successful neighbor. All agents update their strategy
simultaneously. This updating process yields a new distribution of strategies in the population.
3 Spatial evolutionary dynamics
In this section we study the spatial evolutionary dynamics using numerical simulations. An equilibrium is a
spatial distribution of strategies in which no player has an incentive to change strategy. It is important to re-
alize that in our setting it is possible for a neighboring strategy to earn a larger proﬁt than the player’s current
strategy even when these strategies are identical. For example, enforcers punishing one defector are in an
equilibrium, even if they earn the lowest payoffs, as long as their neighbor with the highest payoff is a non-
punishing enforcer. A similar reasoning applies to defectors. This contrasts with Sethi and Somanathan’s
model, in which agents belonging to the same (sub)group always earn equal payoffs, since sanctions and
costs falling on defectors and enforcers are determined at the aggregate level. Such aggregation evidently
leads to a loss of information and accuracy of description.
3.1 Notation and parameter values
We use D;C and E to refer to equilibria composed of only defectors, cooperators and enforcers, respec-
tively. Inaddition, DE;CE and CDE refer to equilibria composed ofthe corresponding mixesofstrategies.
In contrast with D;C and E-equilibria, many diverse equilibrium conﬁgurations can constitute DE;CE or
CDE-equilibria. In addition, note that there cannot be any CD-equilibrium for the simple reason that this
corresponds to the case where there is no local punishment between the agents. In this case, defectors are
never punished and spread quickly over the lattice.
Which equilibrium emerges depends on three factors:
1. The initial spatial distribution of strategies. Initially, strategies either form clusters or are scattered
irregularly. Section 3.3 studies how different equilibria can be reached by varying the initial spatial
arrangement of the strategies, while initial shares remain ﬁxed.







m ), which corresponds to a population composed of a mix of mD defectors, mE
enforcers and mC cooperators in round . We will study how different initial shares (z0) lead to
diverse types of equilibria in Section 3.2.
3. Parameter values. Most of the simulations were performed on a 10x10 (m = 100) spatial grid. A
simulation run corresponds to 50 time steps, which appears to be sufﬁciently long for the system to
settle into an equilibrium. The following parameters were used:
 = 0:2  = 0:2
N0 = 500 w = 0:2
xH = 4 xL = 2
 = 0:4 
 = 0:1:
(13)
Given the other parameter values, the levels of harvest xH and xL satisfy (5).1 The level of sanction
 = 0:4 satisﬁes condition (10).2 A sensitivity analysis of critical parameters is conducted in Section
3.4.
3.2 The effects of initial strategy shares in the population
In this section, westudy the effects of variation in initial strategy shares. Toreduce the number of runs neces-
sary to cover the whole simplex, only initial strategy shares that are multiples of 0.05 are considered. The set
of initial coordinates Z = f(1;0;0);(0:95;0:05;0);::: ;(0:30;0:40;0:30);::: ;(0;0:05;0:95); (0;0;1)g is
composed of 231 coordinates z0. For every z0 2 Z, we compute 100 runs of 50 rounds, each run corre-
sponding to a spatial conﬁguration drawn from a uniform distribution, such that each player has a probability
of 1=100, to be assigned to a particular position. In total, therefore, 23,100 runs are necessary to cover the
1 XP = 67 and XO = 500 according to (12).

































10set Z. We use simplex representations to present the results. In a simplex, each point corresponds to a
three-dimensional coordinate.
Figure 2 provides results about the frequencies of occurrence of each equilibrium for each initial strat-
egy share, where every z0 2 Z is represented by a dot. The grey-black scale indicates the frequency of
occurrence of each type of equilibrium out of 100 random spatial distributions. A black colored coordinate
indicates that, starting with the respective z0, all runs converge to the given type of equilibrium.
As expected, Figure 2a shows that D-equilibria are more easily achieved for initial populations with
few enforcers and, inversely, CE-equilibria are more likely to be reached for initial populations composed
of many enforcers (Figure 2b). This is consistent with Sethi and Somanathan’s ﬁndings. Second, DE-
equilibria are most likely to be achieved for middle-range initial shares with a slight majority of defectors
(Figure 2c), while CDE-equilibria are most frequently achieved for middle-range initial shares with a slight
majority of enforcers (Figure 2d). This makes sense intuitively, since a large number of enforcers needs to
surround cooperators to allow CDE-equilibria to emerge, as we will explain in Section 3.3. When there are
more defectors in the system, cooperators ﬁnd it difﬁcult to survive, and DE-equilibria emerge.
In this example, we ﬁnd that, on average, 41% of the runs (out of 23,100) converge to a D-equilibrium,
18% converge to a CE-equilibrium, 18% to a DE-equilibrium, 20% to a CDE-equilibrium, 3% to a E-
equilibrium3 and 0.4% to a C-equilibrium. Note that frequencies do not add up to 1 due to rounding off.
In order to compare our results with the ones obtained by Noailly et al. (2004), we perform additional
simulations on the torus using their ‘sophisticated’ learning rule. This rule states that agents imitate the
strategy that is the most successful on average. Using the same parameters as above, we ﬁnd that with the
sophisticated learning rule, 79% of the runs (out of 23,100) converge to a D-equilibrium, 23% converge
to a CE-equilibrium, 3% to an E-equilibrium and 0.4% to a C-equilibrium. There are no occurrences of
CDE- and DE-equilibria. In other words, the main consequence of changing the learning rule is that such
equilibria are more difﬁcult to sustain. Qualitatively, tehse equilibria remain possible with the sophisticated
learning rule.
[INSERT Figure 2 about here]
3 The E and C equilibria are not studied by Sethi and Somanathan because in their analysis all initial shares are positive.
113.3 The effects of the initial spatial distribution of strategies
In this section, we study the impact of the initial spatial arrangement of strategies on convergence to equilib-
ria. It turns out that the spatial distribution of strategies matters. The graphs in Figure 3 show possible move-
ments in such a simplex, if the system starts near the center of the simplex at point z0 = (0:30;0:40;0:30),
i.e., with an initial population composed of 30 defectors, 40 enforcers and 30 cooperators. Each simplex
in Figure 3 corresponds to a different random initial spatial arrangement of the strategies. Arrows indicate
the evolution of strategy shares over time and  denotes the number of rounds after which an equilibrium is
reached.
[INSERT Figure 3 about here]
Which equilibrium actually emerges depends crucially on the initial spatial location of the strategies on
the lattice. In general, the coexistence of several strategies in the long run is favored by the formation of
‘clusters’. A cluster is a spatial conﬁguration composed of a central agent and its 4 immediate neighbors.
Any ‘cooperating cluster’ with a central cooperator surrounded by 4 cooperators or non-punishing enforcers
will survive amidst a large number of non-punishing enforcers, because the central cooperator, not being
punished, earns the highest possible payoff. An example is given in Figure 4a. Similarly, a defecting group
will survive when surrounded by cooperators and enforcers as long as the central defector is surrounded by
4 defectors, so that he earns the highest proﬁt (see Figure 4b). One can see that the enforcers around the
cluster are needed for its ‘protection’.
[INSERT Figure 4 about here]
These examples illustrates that the inclusion of a spatial dimension, or a more micro approach, leads
to major differences when compared with Sethi and Somanathan’s results. While in their model only two
equilibria, D and CE, occur, in the spatial model additional equilibria can be observed: namely, DE and
CDE-equilibria. In Sethi and Somanathan’s game, enforcers always earn lower proﬁts than cooperators as
long as there are some defectors in the population, so that, ultimately, they will be completely eliminated.
Instead, in the spatial game with micro-interactions, enforcers E1 to E4 can ‘survive’ in the long run by
forming clusters. This is a crucial element for the occurrence of DE and CDE-equilibria.
12With the sophisticated learning rule, however, the enforcement strategy earn less on average than the
cooperative strategy. Indeed, the presence of punishing enforcers next to non-punishing ones renders the
enforcement strategy less proﬁtable for these non-punishing enforcers, who will eventually switch to co-
operation. This explains intuitively why cooperative clusters can easily survive with a less naive learning
rule.
3.4 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we perform a sensitivity analysis of some central parameters, namely the sanction level ,
the parameter  that reﬂects harvest technology or resource price, and the population size m. Parameters are
varied as follows: the level of sanctions is varied between  = 0:1 and  = 1:5; the parameter  is varied
between  = 0:1 and  = 0:7 and the population size is varied between m = 36 and m = 121, using 5
different grids of 6x6, ..., 11x11.
For each possible parameter conﬁguration, we performed 23,100 simulation runs as in Section 3.2. The
results are given in terms of the average frequency of occurrence of a given equilibrium. Contour lines in
Figure 5 delimit the set of parameters converging to D-equilibria at a given frequency. For instance, the set
of parameter values for which D-equilibria are reached at an average frequency larger or equal to 90% is
located below or on the contour line 0:9.
Figure 5a shows that D-equilibria are more easily achieved for low levels of sanctions. These ﬁndings
make sense intuitively, and are similar to those of Sethi and Somanathan. Further, D-equilibria are more
likely to be reached for a large . An increase in the net return to harvesting, due to, for instance, an im-
provement in technology or an increase in the resource price, causes a rise in proﬁts and gives an extra
advantage to defectors. As a consequence, the set of D-equilibria expands. This is also in line with Sethi
and Somanathan’s ﬁndings.
Figure 5b shows that D-equilibria are best reached for a low level of sanctions and a small population
size. As population size falls, that is, as there are fewer harvesters with the given amount of resource, total
effort decreases. This effect translates into a rise in net return to harvesting, causing the size of the set of
D-equilibria to expand.
Sethi and Somanathan suggest that population growth tend to reduce the importance of sanctions. Their
motivation is that as the group gets larger, it becomes more difﬁcult for enforcers to detect defectors. They
13coin this as an ‘anonimity’ effect which reduces the impact of individual sanctions. Since monitoring occurs
locally in the spatial model, defectors cannot possibly ‘hide’ from their direct neighbors. As a consequence,
there is no anonimity effect in our model. The explanation for the positive effect of population size on
cooperation is that in a larger population and associated large space there are more opportunities for pro-
tected groups of cooperators and defectors to survive. This conclusion is opposite to the one by Sethi and
Somanathan.
[INSERT Figure 5 about here]
4 Spatial evolutionary and resource dynamics
4.1 Resource stock equilibria
In the present section we analyse resource dynamics. Global factors enter the individual payoff functions
through both aggregate effort Xt and resource stock Nt. Just like in the previous section, a large number of
defectors, i.e., a large Xt, reduces individual payoffs. A large resource stock Nt, on the other hand, increases
payoffs for all agents. The change in Nt in turn is inﬂuenced by the level of Xt and thus by the evolution of
strategies. Hence, system dynamics are governed by the interactions between changes in the resource stock
and the evolution of the distribution of strategies.
At the end of each round, the resource stock is increased according to the replenishment rate G(Nt) and
depleted by the total harvest H(Xt;Nt), i.e., the sum of individual harvests:
Nt+1 = Nt + G(Nt)   H(Xt;Nt): (14)









Here r is the intrinsic growth rate of the resource, and NK its carrying capacity.
We follow Sethi and Somanathan by assuming that individual effort is increasing in Nt. The motivation
14for this assumption is that harvesters will intensify their effort level as the resource becomes more abundant.





Here xH and xL are positive constants, with xH > xL; and  is a positive constant.
An equilibrium of the game is a set of strategies over the torus and a resource stock, such that no player
wants to change strategy, given the payoffs of neighboring players, and such that, given the stategies, the
resource stock is constant. Three questions arise. The ﬁrst question is: do equilibria exist? The second
question is: which equilibria are stable? The third is: what is the role of resource dynamics?
The ﬁrst question is relatively easy to answer. Equilibria do exist. A trivial example is the case of
only defectors, with a resource stock satisfying G(N) = H(mxHN;N): But, many other equilibria
exist. Note, however, that equilibrium resource stocks might be zero. This is, trivially, the case when the G
and the H functions only intersect when the resource stock is zero. The resource stock will be inevitably
depleted in the long run when aggregate harvest exceeds the replenishment rate of the resource for all
stock levels. It is also possible that a D equilibrium will result in overexploitation of the resource for any
stock level, ultimately giving rise to resource exhaustion, while a DE or a CDE-equilibrium is consistent
with sustainable resource use and thus a positive equilibrium resource level. This partly answers the third
question: resource regeneration characteristics may strongly affect the equilibrium.
It seems impossible to address the stability issue analytically. For that reason we have performed sim-
ulations, starting from a given distribution of shares, while varying their spatial distribution. We use the
same parameters as in Section 3. In addition, we set r = 0:5, NK = 1000, N0 = 500; = 0:05, and
 = 0:5. These parameters also satisfy condition (10)4. Figure 6 provides examples of different approach
paths. Figure 6a displays the approach path to a D equilibrium. The approach path shows non-monotonic
behavior, for the resource stock, as well as for strategy shares. In ﬁgure 6b with a CDE-equilibrium this
also holds, whereas in ﬁgure 6c monotonicity prevails. Therefore, approach paths may exhibit oscillating











15behaviors. Even cycling toward equilibrium can occur.
[INSERT Figure 6 about here]
Finally, some characterizations of the equilibria are given in Table 1, which presents statistics of the
equilibrium resource stocks for 100 random runs, starting with z0 = (0:30;0:40;0:30). The resource equi-
libria for D and CE equilibria are NH = 616:96 and NL = 669:25, respectively. Equilibrium resource
stocks for DE and CDE-equilibria vary within this range. CDE equilibria exist, in contrast with Sethi
and Somanathan. On average, equilibrium resource stocks for CDE-equilibria are larger than equilibrium
stocks for DE-equilibria. This makes sense, since CDE-equilibria are often characterized by a larger num-
ber of cooperative players. This diversity of stock equilibria contrasts with Sethi and Somanathan’s (1996)
results. Indeed, in their model, only NH and NL are possible equilibrium resource stocks, given that only
two types of equilibra, D and CE, exist.
[INSERT Table 1 about here]
Table 1. Final stock levels at  = 50 for different equilibria, with z0 = (0:30;0:40;0:30).
ND NDE NCDE NCE
Max 616.96 628.60 644.37 669.25
Min 616.96 618.61 622.40 669.25
Average 616.96 621.30 627.3 669.25
Std Dev 0 2.22 4.58 0
5 Conclusions
A spatial common-pool resource game has been studied, where space is deﬁned as a two-dimensional torus.
The combination of evolution, space and resource combines in a unique way local and global interactions.
This implies a complex system, which requires numerical simulation to be understood well. The results
complement analytical results for a related model in a twin paper (Noailly et al., 2004). The numerical
ﬁndings can be seen as a robustness test.
The main objective was to see if the ﬁndings in a non-spatial, but otherwise similar, game of Sethi and
16Somanathan (1996) are robust against introducing spatial or microlevel interactions among agents. This
turns out to be not the case. An important new ﬁnding is that indeed clusters of cooperators and enforcers
can survive among large groups of defectors. In addition, all other strategy equilibria found by Sethi and
Somathan were assessed here as well.
Because Sethi and Somanathan restrict themselves to aggregate population dynamics, all agents follow-
ing the same strategy face the same punishment or sanctioning costs, and the same proﬁts. The incorporation
of local interactions in our approach means that the replicator dynamics in Sethi and Somathan is replaced
by the explicit modeling of micro-interactions among individuals. A combination of local and global in-
teractions results, where global interactions include feedback through both aggregate harvest and resource
stock to proﬁts associated with harvesting strategies. A difference with Sethi and Somathan is that in our
setting it is possible for identical strategies to have different proﬁts, due to the fact that local neighborhoods
can be different. As a result, the evolutionary dynamics become difﬁcult to predict. Such disaggregation
evidently increases realism and accuracy of description, at the cost of analytical tractability.
The occurrence of equilibria with clusters of cooperators and enforcers, and in which all three strategies
appear, can be explained as follows. Enforcers punishing defectors can survive in the long run, as long as
no cooperators are located in their neighborhood. Second, cooperators are protected by the formation of
clusters of cooperators and enforcers around enforcers who do not punish any defectors. As a result, the
imitiation effect of the high proﬁt of enforcing can be regarded to diffuse through space. These results stress
a general insight, namely that spatial interactions favor diversity.
Conditions for the emergence of cooperative equilibria are identiﬁed by performing a range of sensitivity
analyses (not all shown here). For example, population growth is shown to enlarge the set of cooperative
equilibria, because it negatively affects the net return to harvesting.
Finally, some results were obtained for the case with resource dynamics. The diversity of possible
equilibria is not affected by it. For each strategy equilibrium an associated resource stock equilibrium can
be found, as long as the aggregate harvest does not exceeds the replenishment rate of the resource for all
stock levels. As a counterpart, with a low initial stock or a low replenishment rate, fewer strategy equilibria
are possible. The equilibrium stock will be larger for a cooperative equilibrium than for a defecting one.
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(b) Frequencies for initial coordinates converging to CE-equilibria
(c) Frequencies for initial coordinates converging to DE-equilibria
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Figure 3. Evolution of strategy shares over time for four different initial spatial distributions of strategies,
with z0 = (0:30;0:40;0:30).
(a) Cooperating group in a
large population of defec-
tors
(b) Defecting group in a
large population of coop-
erators and enforcers
Figure 4. Examples of clustering in CDE-equilibria, at  = 50, with z0 = (0:30;0:40;0:30).
21(a) Parameter space (;), m = 100. (b) Parameter space (m;),  = 0:2.
Figure 5. Range of convergence to D-equilibria (contour lines denote average frequencies of occurrence
over all spatial conﬁgurations)
(a) D-equilibrium (b) CDE-equilibrium (c) CE-equilibrium
Figure 6. Evolution of strategies and resource stock dynamics toward an equilibrium.
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